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CAS 2 *Agricultural Strategies*. Joyce Marcus and Charles Stanish (editors)

CAS 1 *Theory and Practice in Mediterranean Archaeology. Old World and New World Perspectives*. John K. Papadopoulos and Richard M. Levanthal (editors)

**AGRICULTURAL STRATEGIES**

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Archaeologists have long asked questions about the connections between political power, economics, and the role that state governments play in what we interpret as agricultural intensification attempts and all the ramifications—social, political, and economic—that may be inferred from them. Until the 1990s a fairly simple line was often drawn, connecting large-scale efforts to intensify production and the idea of top-down directives from authoritarian rulers. Recently, this idea has been questioned, largely via the consideration of ethnographic case studies, which sometimes illustrate the coercive or suggestive power of elites and sometimes indicate that labor mobilization and the building of substantial agricultural features can be traced to farming communities that are capable of imagining, creating, and maintaining large, complicated, and laborious intensification schemes without authoritarian commands. This has led some researchers to replace the top-down assumption with general skepticism about the extent of elite authority in organizing intensification.

Studies of current problems by sociocultural anthropologists, economists, political scientists, development experts, and others demonstrate that in between state coercion and total self-organization lies a large variety of processes: negotiation with the state, disgruntled or resigned semicompliance, rebellion, and other strategies. Since the ethnographic trajectories of such intensification sequences are so invariably complex compared to the simple either/or archaeological paradigm noted above, it is useful to study archaeological cases that have some ethnohistoric context, testing various scenarios against the physical and textual evidence.

The goal of this study is to argue that a superior approach to such problems is to combine two current paradigms, to take advantage of their individual
strengths, and mitigate their weaknesses: what Stanish (this symposium) identifies as the political economic core principle and the agency/historical ecology core principle. The author’s long-term field project, “Decentralized Societies and the Development of Secondary States,” which began in 1992 in southern Scandinavia and continues today, has advocated for the general principle that by examining several scales of analysis simultaneously, both large-scale, statewide data and local (regional and subregional-scale) data, a more complete picture of past processes can be obtained. In addition, the study of site-specific data must be combined with overarching cultural and natural landscape analysis and, when possible, its interface with ethnohistoric records and relevant ethnographic data (Thurston 1997, 1999, 2001).

This contribution thus employs a cross-cultural perspective, using archaeological, ethnohistoric, and ethnographic data to explore both central elite strategies and the possibilities of local, rural agency in the process of cereal and animal intensification during a period of state building and unification. The study compares two areas under a single political authority yet with highly variable environments, both “barren” and “fertile,” differing agroeconomic practices, disparate local sociopolitical conditions, and differing relations with the state. When we compare the archaeology with our knowledge of ethnohistorical accounts, what can be construed as local entrepreneurship and what as top-down directive? How are these two strategies manifest in recent ethnographic cases, and how can we relate this to archaeological problems?

In the recent literature pertaining to government-sponsored agricultural intensification and development projects, most authors acknowledge some general shared and somewhat predictable problems for economic and development planning in nations with diverse regions—sometimes with ethnic or language differences, sometimes with highly varied resources, sometimes with a variety of land-tenure systems. When planning or dictating activities in such areas the solution is often a specialized regional approach, applying different strategies for different areas (Bhalia Khan 1979; Misra et al. 1985; Ndongko 1974:4). This has often been supported by archaeological evidence in many lesser-known and well-cited cases (Brumfiel 1980, 1983; D’Altroy and Earle 1985; Feinman et al. 1985) where the state has organized its various regions in quite different ways, analogous to Stanish’s political economic model, in which rulers, leaders, or other political elites direct intensification attempts and strategize carefully to exploit production on a differential basis.

Yet ethnographers tell us that even as development schemes are hatched by central elites, differing peasant traditions and historical circumstances in various areas substantially impact even powerful centralized plans. For example, in Ethiopia several formerly autonomous polities and some tribal and chiefly areas were conquered by Menilek, who became emperor in the late nineteenth
century (Ståhl 1973:4). These territories, and the farmlands they harbored, remained in the hands of an imperial family for many generations. By the late twentieth century, in some cases peasants had been forcibly turned into tenants; in others, groups retained corporate ownership of land.

Ruthless schemes were enacted in these conquered/incorporated regions to squeeze greater amounts of tribute or cash from smallholders. In some places they were dispossessed of their tenancies entirely so that land consolidation and intensification could take place according to elite wishes. In yet others, traditional land-tenure practices sheltered farmers from the worst of these state intensification attempts, especially where large kin groups held land corporately instead of individually (Ståhl 1973:5–8). Ethiopia is a good example but by no means isolated: the impact of political history on the outcomes of local-central interactions has been noted in many ethnographic cases (Bartlett 1980:552–553).

In the Ethiopian case we can thus see both the political economy model and the agency/historical ecology model in play simultaneously in different regions: agency + history creating differences in preexisting relationships that seem to have affected the amount of restraint that state authorities used while pushing their programs of intensification. These historical, contingent conditions include those within a region itself, such as the existence of long-established corporate land-tenure practices that increased group solidarity and also those that relate to conditions between local and state authorities. In this case the state seems to have postponed conflict with large, unified kin groups that might mobilize politically or foment rebellions against central authority. In areas where local farmers were not well organized and did not have “ancient” established rights, the state did not restrain itself at all. Both types of human-centered and human-created relationships had a strong effect on the outcome of political economic designs.

Few ethnographers would be surprised that two such models—elite coercion vs. local agency—would operate at the same time within the same state organization. In fact, a great deal has been written about what has been termed the difference between “policy-led intensification” and “autonomous intensification” (Birch-Thomsen 1999; Lele and Stone 1990). Archaeologists, as cited above, have sometimes been able to demonstrate, supportably, that different organization strategies for agriculture (and other institutions) are used by prehistoric states in differing regions. Yet it is difficult for many to fully support claims for the actual mechanisms that permit the state to sweep in, as did the Ethiopian imperial regime, or for those mechanisms that fend it off, notably kinship or other types of solidarity, strengthened by the ability of a group to claim it follows “ancient” or established ways of doing things. Yet it is clear in current and historic examples that this mind-set—that one’s group has inalienable rights to some place or practice—can create formidable resistance.
In the following case study and discussion I will use my own research context, protohistoric in nature, to try and illuminate how such processes might be visible in the archaeological record. In late Iron Age Denmark, the context of my studies, there are enough fragmentary ethnohistoric documents to paint an overarching picture of “central state” intentionality regarding surplus, taxation, and agropastoralism. Yet in almost every other respect only archaeology can illuminate the process of centralized attempts at enacting these intentions. I argue that careful study of the archaeological material does indeed show that clearly differing regional strategies were employed. Furthermore, ethnohistoric records from two of the “conquered” or incorporated areas that made up parts of the state indicate the response of the regional elites and peasantry, giving us some idea about the “agency” aspects of the process often either lacking or only theoretically inferred in many archaeological sequences.

AGROPASTORALISM AND THE STATE IN PREHISTORIC AND PROTOHISTORIC SOUTH SCANDINAVIA

Paleoecological and archaeological studies of southern Scandinavia (Figure 6.1) have shown that human influence has impacted landscape formation for the last 5,000 years (Birks et al. 1988:229). Farming has been practiced in southern Scandinavia since the early Neolithic of that region (ca. 3200 BC), and dramatic episodes of clearing, expansion, and intensification can be seen in pollen cores, soil studies, and other ecological indicators. Beginning in the Neolithic and continuing until recent times, monumental earthworks and constructions dot the region, and prehistoric villages, fortifications, and towns have left their mark as well. Conversely, the natural landscape has also been a strong determinant in prehistoric agricultural and settlement strategies.

To put these factors in context, our project takes the perspective that environment is an influence on human behavior but not a deterministic one or necessarily a limiting one. We do agree, however, that some environments necessitate special strategies. While Denmark contains no deserts, rainforests, or other environments that some consider likely to strongly impact human subsistence strategies, there are some fairly extreme differences between the regions that we will examine. Ultimately, these differences partly lie behind later patterns of urbanization, market activity, and agriculture.

It is therefore important to consider both the physical and cultural landscape of the later Iron Age in southern Scandinavia, the period from about 500 BC to AD 1050, and into the early Middle Age, to about AD 1200. We can focus both on synchronic variation and diachronic change and attempt to distinguish the interrelation between changes in the agricultural landscapes
and changes in sociopolitical organization during the unification of several regions into the state of Denmark.

Natural landscape conditions most affecting cultural practices include climate and temperature, geology and glacial effects, vegetation, soils, and topography. The cultural landscape includes the built landscape of settlements, both central places and hinterlands, monuments, roads, and fields but also the exploited nonanthropogenic features, such as bogs, shorelines, and forests, and the ideological use of springs, lakes, hills, and groves for ritual purposes. To address the cultural landscape, this chapter will examine archaeological features and historical data.

As noted, analysis on several scales is imperative to understanding both generalities and specificities of this case study: a general large-scale picture of southern Scandinavia and a closer discussion of two specific areas in which the author has conducted research (Figure 6.2). The first, Järrastads Herred, Scania, where the author carried out a five-year project from 1992 to 1996, is in

Figure 6.1. Denmark in the Iron Age.
an area with excellent soils and favorable conditions for cereal agriculture. The second area is Hassing Herred, Thy. This region lies in northern Jutland, with mostly poor soils formed in glacial outwash sands, on which heathland grew until late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century modifications rendered much of it into croplands. In historic and prehistoric times only a narrow strip of soil on the area’s eastern shore was what might be considered “good farmland.” The author has worked in this area since 1997 and is currently beginning a new three-year phase of research in the region.

These two regions were purposely chosen for comparative study because they are contrasting in their ecological nature. Such differing natural conditions suggest that different forms of agriculture were practiced, and different ways of life can be imagined. Additionally, and perhaps most interesting, each area had a distinct, prestate ethnopolitical identity, and the early ethnohistoric record indicates that both areas resisted incorporation into the state through bloody rebellions and uprisings during the time when the state was consolidating its power through the application of new taxes, laws, and land-tenure organization.

Figure 6.2. Denmark’s core state area and outlying provinces.
One region was unsuccessful in its rebellion, which was quelled with several bloody episodes. The other achieved far more satisfactory results against state authority, although it was not able to completely forestall unification.

**SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL BOUNDARIES OF THE STUDY AREA**

The study area (Figure 6.1), which is sometimes referred to as “old Denmark,” consists of the peninsula of Jutland, which lies above the Eider River, including Shleswig-Holstein, now part of northern Germany. It includes the four large islands Sjælland, Fyn, Lolland, and Falster, which lie to the east of Jutland, and 470-odd smaller islands that form an archipelago. Today’s southern Sweden, or Scania, was the easternmost part of Denmark.

The Iron Age in southern Scandinavia is divided into several phases, and in most work pertaining to this region a culture-historic based chronology is used, which includes phases such as the pre-Roman, Roman, and Germanic Iron Ages, the Viking Age, and the early medieval. In this discussion I may refer to these terms, yet our project uses an entirely different parallel chronology that is based on political changes, which have corresponding social and economic shifts associated with them. Thus, we refer to the preintegration phase, the integration phase, and the consolidation phase, followed by the centralized state (Figure 6.3).

![Figure 6.3. Chronology/phases for Danish state development.](image-url)
THE NATURAL LANDSCAPE

Between 500 BC and AD 500, the Sub-Atlantic climatic minimum occurred, with its least favorable period occurring after 50 BC (Emanuelsson 1987). This period was considerably colder and wetter than modern times. After AD 500 the climate began to ameliorate, and by the late Iron Age in Denmark, AD 800–1050, temperatures were roughly similar to today’s, ranging from 0 to 5 degrees centigrade in winter and 15 to 20 degrees centigrade in summer (Sømme 1968:118). Rainfall in western and central Jutland is about 750 mm per annum, with the islands and Scania reaching 1,000 mm (FAO 1981:Appendix 1). Deglaciated earlier than northern Scandinavia, the region that made up what would become Iron Age Denmark developed soil and vegetation earlier and is in the deciduous zone rather than the conifer belt, which lies directly to the north (Sømme 1968:119). Climate is classified as cool temperate Marine (FAO 1981:Appendix 9). The whole region lies in the Mesothermic temperate forest belt, with western Jutland consisting of boreo-atlantic oak and birch forest, and eastern Jutland, the islands, and Scania lying in the zone of Baltic beech forest (FAO 1981:Appendix 5).

Denmark’s geomorphic structure falls into two types: old moraine, which escaped glaciation during the last Ice Age, and new moraine, which was covered with ice until the late Pleistocene, about 9,000 years ago (Somme 1968:103). This dichotomy in turn affects the soils, vegetation, and landscape in the two regions (Figure 6.4).

The old moraine landscape, found on the western coast and central portion of Jutland, consists of glacial outwash plain bordered by salt marsh or Geest. Large deposits of outwash sand serve as parent material in much of Jutland. This outwash generated highly drained and low-nutrient soils (Somme 1968:116). During parts of the Iron Age windblown sand eroding out of these areas also became a factor of soil formation, mixing with soils and sometimes covering entire settlements and their field systems, such as the village of Lindholm Høje in northern Jutland (Marseen 1959:66). This Viking Age village was completely covered with drift-sand during its occupation, forcing its abandonment. Situated in one of the few clay-soil areas of Jutland, its ridged field furrows and the tracks of a farm cart were perfectly preserved under the drifting dunes.

The new moraine is overlain by soils that are richer in clay and other nutrients and is the substrate for all the islands and the province of Scania. On Jutland new moraine is limited to a narrow strip on the east coast and small areas on the tip of the peninsula. In addition to these glacial contexts, soils were affected by the isostatic uplift occurring since the last Ice Age. The already poor west coast of Jutland is sinking, while the north and east is rising, resulting in
parent material of raised seabeds relatively rich in marine clays. More marine clays and sediments were deposited during several postglacial transgressions of the Baltic between 8000 and 4000 BC (Sømme 1968:114). These deposits added to the fertility of some soils.

As much as we will examine the agency paradigm in this discussion (which we will), these notable regional differences in geomorphology mean that soils are one of the primary factors relating to human subsistence and settlement strategies throughout prehistory, including the Iron Ages. Jutland's large, low-lying plain of over-drained outwash sand, plus the relatively high rainfall and moderate temperature, leads to the formation of several types of podzols, or sandy, nutrient-leached soils. Associated with these are histosols, soils with 75 percent or more organic matter, mainly peat (FAO 1974:24). The western
coast of Jutland also contains large expanses of calcic fluvisols. These have been drained and reclaimed for farming since the nineteenth century (FAO 1981:67) but in the Iron Age were marshy hay meadows suitable for the cutting of animal fodder but not for cultivation. The very top of the Jutland peninsula and the eastern, Baltic, side has relatively large extents of eutric cambisols, soils far more favorable to agriculture (FAO 1974:37). The islands and the majority of Scania are also fertile, being largely made up of eutric cambisols and orthic fluvisols, both good agricultural media (FAO 1981:35).

Because of these soil conditions cereal agriculture on Jutland was limited and until early historic times relied on swiddening strategies, and the region was more suited to animal husbandry, while the islands and Scania were favorable for the production of wheat in climatically favorable times and for barley, rye, and oats during the Sub-Atlantic. These were the main grain crops of the Iron Age.

THE TRAJECTORY OF STATE POWER IN PREHISTORIC AND PROTOHISTORIC DENMARK

In Figure 6.3 one can note the traditional phase names on the left and the project’s study phases on the right. Preintegration represents the era when several autonomous peer polities coexisted, Integration the long era during which slow unification and state formation occurred, and Consolidation a period of rapid shifts during which the state made decisive changes in the social, political, and economic orders. During the prestate era called the Roman Iron Age (RIA), Denmark consisted of several peer polities, best characterized as warlord chiefdoms, each with a chiefly center, surrounded by farming settlements (Hedeager 1992; Randsborg 1990). Concentrations of gold and prestige import goods on the island of Fyn (Hansen 1987; Randsborg 1990) presumably indicate the home of warlords powerful enough to monopolize importation of Roman items that were used to mark elite status and reward followers. By the end of the RIA and into the Germanic Iron Age (GIA), as smaller polities merged into larger, those elites who inhabited the island of Fyn appear, archaeologically, to be the wealthiest and most influential; early chronicles indicate that Fyn was the home of the first rulers of a coalescing, yet still decentralized, state.

From within Denmark, evidence is completely archaeological: apart from runestones, indigenous texts referring to contemporary and earlier events do not predate the twelfth century. Germania by Tacitus, a Roman historian whose surviving works document the era’s imperial politics, is the primary source for this period. Recently his work has been scrutinized by archaeologists, who have found surprisingly accurate corroboration for the material culture he described (Hansen 1987; Hedeager 1992; Randsborg 1990). This is true of most Roman
authors; in fact, although some of their perspectives are skewed, they are generally reliable and often sophisticated, almost ethnographic, in detail. Similar to the way in which Celtic archaeologists are able to avail themselves of Julius Caesar’s descriptions of the Gauls and their social and political idiosyncrasies, most archaeologists and historians of Scandinavia and Northern Germany cautiously rely on descriptions of cultural practices described in Germania that do not leave archaeological traces.

Tacitus reported that chieftains had limited power and that leaders and followers had mutual bonds and obligations to each other. Rulers required assent from a powerful legislative assembly that met at predetermined times to debate the law and cast votes for or against the plans of warlords (Tacitus 1967 [AD 98]). Despite these “checks and balances,” at the same time a vertical hierarchy operated within the war band, and social classes are evident. During warfare with Rome the chiefs would ally, and a single overlord was selected to lead collectively for short periods, but the support of peers was required (Lindow 1976:11). If an overlord seized too much power, the social code actively encouraged his assassination. Documented cases in Roman accounts specify that removal was aimed explicitly at those who were too “kinglike.”

Beginning in the eighth century, contemporary foreign texts, such as the Frankish chronicles, allude to Danish elites in the Fyn/southern Jutland core, who successfully led allied groups against them. This may have bolstered core-area elites’ growing power over former peers. Warfare simultaneously created need for new sources of wealth, military manpower, and legitimation of leaders. The most visible solution was the outward trading/raiding expansion of the Vikings, eastward into Russia and southwestward to Europe. Yet this outward movement was far less important for state formation than the internal turmoil caused by changes at home. Here elites solved their problems of money and manpower by attempting the transformation of the autonomous, decentralized, and only loosely allied peer polities into a highly stratified, centralized state.

STRATEGIES OF ELITES FOR THE CONTROL OF DISPARATE REGIONS

Despite retaining decentralized characteristics, such states must still maintain a political economy and some kind of power over constituent parts. Economic, religious, and political decision making are channels through which centralized elites typically exert power. While elites in decentralized states may desire such power, it must be acquired slowly and indirectly or be disguised, for example, by using local officials as agents, maintaining illusions of local control.

In centralized states elites often intimidate and compel by dramatically displaying power, coercing labor, or encouraging belief in elite divinity,
forcibly extracting support and obedience. Danish elites did not attempt this; it usually resulted in death. Similar to the strategy of Ethiopian elites in the mid-twentieth century, it is sometimes better to leave cohesive and powerful groups alone, while pursuing exploitation of others who are more helpless or less organized.

This does not imply that military or other violent solutions are not an option in such cases; they are simply costly and often not undertaken unless conditions change enough to force the government’s hand. Such domination depends on direct coercion, but for controlling powerful entities that have, or believe themselves to have, inalienable rights, led by those who believe they are peers rather than subjects, hegemony is a better strategy: constructing political-economic conditions and sociocultural values that create a desire in subordinate groups to accept core primacy. Given the precarious nature of Danish rulers’ power and the constant possibility of assassination either by elite rivals or one’s own local constituency, it is not surprising that unification took a long time. Despite this, in a long, uneven, and difficult process the former peers were eventually subsumed into a unified, centralized state.

THE DUAL ROLES OF STATE POLITICAL ECONOMY AND REGIONAL AGENCY IN AGRICULTURAL INTENSIFICATION

To review the sequence: during the early part of the Viking Age a polity in the state’s core area succeeded in unifying peers on southern Jutland and the large islands into a single kingdom (Figure 6.2). Markers of successful centralized elite directives appear during the 800s, in the form of massive bridges, complex systems of royal roads, royally administered markets, defensive earthworks, and large shipping canals that were cut through dry land at great labor costs. From runestones we know that different types of central officials oversaw activity in several towns in this core area.

In the areas of the map marked northern Jutland, Scania, and Halland, this was not the case. These areas remained remote and largely autonomous, even after the central state began to claim them as provinces in other runic inscriptions, something that can be observed by about the mid-tenth century. Partly, this can be traced to the long-standing political situation, in which allied peer polities sometimes operated in concert yet maintained autonomy. Another part of it can be assigned to ethnicity issues between the Danes and the neighbors they sought to control.

At first glance it may seem amusing and a little absurd that people inhabiting what are now southern Sweden and northern Denmark saw themselves as fundamentally different in many ways during the Iron Age. Yet these regions believed that they were ethnically different from each other and from the Danes
of the central core area. Ethnicity is generally understood to be a self-defined concept based on beliefs about common descent and culture. It may be defined by kinship, eating habits, or historical experience as much as by appearance or language. The concept of ethnicity in archaeology is one that is sometimes difficult to nail down. It cannot always be tied to a “style,” an artifact cluster, or a house type. Because of this we sometimes imagine that it is preferable to leave the concept out altogether rather than to venture into unknown territory and use it incorrectly. However, in our case study it is not impossible to address and may provide some models for other less-clear-cut cases.

That ethnicity is an important organizing structure in state politics is an established concept in cultural anthropology, as well as in a number of archaeological cases where it can be demonstrated (e.g., Brumfiel and Fox 1994). While current geopolitics are dominated by the concept of globalization, and “modern” political concepts were focused on the “bordered power container” of the nation-state (Giddens 1989:120), in other times and places ethnicity transcended many other sociopolitical categories within complex societies.

Ethnographers have no lack of evidence of its impact on the balance of power and the level of hostility or cooperation between region and center. Violent clashes can occur between minority groups and the ascendant group over trade, religion, language, culture, and domination vs. self-determination (Osaghae 1995:5). Battles over control of important economic resources are typical, especially when those who provide a nation’s wealth feel marginalized (Osaghae 1995).

As if to further confound the archaeologist, ethnicity can have effects of an opposite nature in local affairs. When pressed by central authorities viewed as outsiders, or by any group considered to be outside their own, regionalized ethnic groups frequently use their common ethnicity for the “mobilization of local capital through self-help efforts” and an “unprecedented upsurge in the number and activities of ethnic unions of various complexions: ‘development’ unions, ‘progressive’ unions, ‘hometown’ associations, social clubs, community development associations, and cultural organizations” (Osaghae 1995:5). Reportedly, sometimes “new” forms of ethnic expression develop, but “the vast majority were old, sometimes moribund, associations that were invigorated to meet new challenges” (Osaghae 1995:6). This phenomenon—that ethnicity strengthens, revitalizes, or even initially forms most dramatically when challenges from “outside” appear—is a well-known aphorism in anthropology, a process sometimes referred to as tribalization (Whitehead 1995). Often tribalization occurs as a response by traditional peoples who are being subsumed within a nation-state (Cruz 1999). Ethnic unity movements may often take the shape of development, or intensification, of indigenous resources, be they industrial or agricultural, and often these movements indicate targeted
strategies by locals to revive or bolster the health of local unity and identity (Stone 1998). As Southall (1988) expressed in the title of his exploration of the role of local centers in state intensification, “What else is development other than helping your own hometown?”

We can understand these identities if we examine what documentary evidence we have about northern Jutland and Scania during the preintegration phase of our study. North Jutland, and Thy (pronounced “tew”) in particular, was the place of origin for a group that played a large role in the Roman accounts of the barbarian “migrations”: the group the Romans recorded as the Teutones. In turn Scania was the homeland of the Langobards, who became known in later times as the Lombards. These “tribal” entities, as the Romans characterized them, were somewhat fluid in terms of the frequent creation and disbanding of alliances that were hard to keep track of—often, they traveled in large, shifting confederations as they roamed across Europe in Late Imperial times. This is not indicative of similarity in group identity but is instead an artifact of the long-standing alliance system that operated in their homelands for many centuries, at least.

During the period we refer to as the integration phase, when a slow, creeping unification was occurring (Thurston 1997) and external threats from the Franks united these groups, ethnic identity may have taken a backseat to creating a united front. By the late Viking Age the threat was mostly from would-be kings in Denmark, and an invigoration of old identities and solidarities may have well occurred.

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SEQUENCE IN SCANIA

Scania, the first autonomous/incorporated region to be examined, was a highly desirable territory. Around AD 1070 the chronicle of a German traveler to the Danish court described Scania as “fair” and rich, with a high population and “opulent” harvests and merchandise (Tschan 1959:191). Archaeological and paleobotanical evidence supports this: there were hundreds of large villages with populations of several hundred people each, and natural vegetation was almost entirely lacking. Since south-central Jutland, a large part of the core, was a sandy, agriculturally poor heath, Danish rulers had logical motives for incorporating Scania, but centuries of decentralization, combined with a strong local sense of ethnic identity, inhibited the process.

The earliest indigenous texts (Lund 1984; Scholz 1972) indicate that during the integration phase, Scanians loosely acknowledged the core-area Danes as leaders but probably not as rulers. As the core grew more centralized, settlement patterns did not change in Scania: there were no urban places, and the earlier chiefly centers continued to function, disconnected from central authority,
unlike the core area, where signs of central authority are seen as early as AD 720 and increase through time. Neither the cultural landscape nor any institutions extant in the region exhibit centralization under broader authority. This does not mean that society did not function; rather, it reflects a system that people approved of and valued, one without central interference in established daily praxis or in higher-level political and economic events.

INCIPIENT AND MATURE CENTRALIZING TRENDS

In the mid-800s the state attempted to build infrastructure in Scania (Figures 6.5 and 6.6a). A group of seasonal export locations was established for collecting Scanian agricultural products and perhaps silver for taxes, and there is some evidence that marketplace activities accompanied the seasonal roundup of goods (Brattberg 1983; Ohlsson 1976; Rausing 1990). State control is evident in nearly identical names, administrative boundaries around each site, simultaneous founding, and near-perfect spacing for provincial control. Importantly, they are limited to Scania. They appeared when political unification existed, but systemic integration was incomplete. While this helped exploit Scania’s wealth, it was a feeble attempt, since it added a method of wealth extraction but did not change preexisting political organization or regionalized institutions.

Figure 6.5. Towns in late Iron Age and early medieval Denmark.
Then, between AD 980 and 1000, this pattern abruptly changed. Four evenly spaced administrative towns were founded in Scania by royal charter (Figure 6.6b). Law, taxation, coining, markets, industries, and important religious functions, previously practiced in rural locations, were all conflated at these new, urban central places, and redundant export markets were simultaneously abandoned, further indicating that they had not been as successful as desired. At the same time, the Scanian chiefly centers were abandoned. Also in this short period (dendrochronologically dated to the 980s) six large, nearly identical, centrally controlled fortresses, today called “Trelleborgs” (palisaded forts), were constructed around Denmark, two in Scania, one in North Jutland, and three in the general core region (Jacobsson 1995; Svanberg and Söderberg 1999).

![Figure 6.6. Development of Scanian markets, towns, and fortresses.](image)

**AGRICULTURAL INTENSIFICATION AS A CENTRALIZING STRATEGY**

Another strategy of the state may have been agricultural intensification and land reform. As will be seen, the course of intensification appears to be too large-scale, too simultaneous, and too ubiquitous to be completely assigned a local origin, although good arguments have been made that such conditions can be self-organized by farmers (Lansing and Kremer 1993). However, as will be discussed below, aspects of these changes strongly suggest otherwise, and these strategies, once in place, gave a great deal of economic and political advantage to the state, while reducing that of local people.
EVIDENCE FOR A STATE-SPONSORED MOVE TOWARD DISPERSED SETTLEMENT

The first of these possible state political economy strategies for agriculture is seen across Denmark but especially in Scania’s rural hinterland. During the consolidation phase, the same 40 to 60 years that brought urbanization, military bases, and the disappearance of chiefly centers, thousands of torps, tiny, dispersed agricultural settlements, were founded, some of which appear to be laid out on identical, predetermined plans. Since it reduces labor and travel time, dispersed settlement often reflects intensification efforts (Drennan 1988:274).

These torp settlements were primarily carved out of already-used farmland, with some in new settlement areas. They were populated by people drawn from preexisting villages: as will be seen, older villages shrank by about the same amount of population that was needed to populate these new villages. While in other similar agricultural parts of Denmark, the density of these settlements is about .061 per square kilometer; in Scania it is .136 per square kilometer (Thurston n.d.), nearly double. This colonization effectively raised efficiency and yield on already-farmed land and opened up more arable land, so woodlands almost disappeared (Berglund et al. 1991:112). In addition to the labor saved in agriculture, the analysis of labor saved by conflation of various institutional services in one urban location—one of the four newly founded towns—also shows time savings, leaving farmers more time to spend on agricultural projects to raise yields (Thurston 1999).

EVIDENCE FOR FORCED SETTLEMENT REORGANIZATION

At the same time, there was an unusual restructuring of the older villages: they were internally reorganized and contracted up to 60 percent, with excess population probably moving to the new torps. This involved the razing of each village, each of which had occupied the same locale for about 500 years, and the movement of previously loosely and somewhat haphazardly nucleated farms down to neat, side-by-side rows of houses along a village street, usually not farther than 250 to 500 meters from where the old farm had stood.

ADOPTION OF NEW INTENSIFICATION TECHNOLOGIES AND METHODS

Simultaneously, two-field crop/fallow rotation was replaced by the more intensive three-field system, and the low-productivity ard plow was replaced by the more productive moldboard plow.
DISCUSSION: POLITICAL ECONOMY OR AGENCY?

We do know, definitively, from early ethnohistoric texts, that at this time new taxes and regulations were put in place across Denmark, sparking much protest. It is quite conceivable that some of these changes observed in the agricultural landscape were locally organized strategies, as per the agency model discussed above. Farmers, pressed for higher taxes, may have adopted new crop rotations and technology; these were already in use in Western Europe and were probably not unknown. Farmers may also have pioneered new territory under duress to increase yields, although the much higher density of Scanian torps, compared to those in the islands, in what was already both the best and highest yielding land, is puzzling and suggests that some other factors, at least, were involved.

The deconstruction and rebuilding of extant villages, however, is a very strange phenomenon. Ethnographers working in all parts of the world have noted that such resettlement, when government sponsored, even over short distances, is highly disruptive and traumatic to farming people (De Wet 1993; Scudder and Colson 1982). Since the effect is similar cross-culturally, it is usually termed a cognitive effect, which we can argue would have operated 1,000 years ago much as it does today. The disturbance typically persists for a minimum of 18 to 24 months but usually can be observed for much longer. Even after years informants curse authorities that either forced or encouraged them to abandon their familiar, ancestral houses, outbuildings, and even pathways and, if possible, will eagerly move back to the village or farm, no matter how poor. There is also remarkable similarity, ethnographically speaking, in the way that governments knowingly exploit the havoc such moves create, since one symptom of uprooting is that long-held beliefs and practices are more easily lost or changed. It has even been suggested that this effect, as much as any agricultural “improvement,” is behind such programs today (De Wet 1993).

Since the practice of uprooting and moving people for purposes of control is at least as old as (and perhaps much older than) the textual evidence from the era of the neo-Assyrians of Iron Age southwest Asia, c. 900–600 BC, it is not impossible to hypothesize that this effect was anticipated by Danish rulers in the late first millennium AD.

Why should we link this change to political economy and not agency? In the earliest part of the historic period (ca. 1200), when written records became more common, it is clear that a system of rural taxation was in place with the following features: the state required farmers to site their actual households on closely packed regulated plots of land. The size of the house plot symbolized the size of the farmer’s hectarage, which was spread in strips all over the village in what is called an “open field system.” Thus farmers could not deceive tax
collectors with vague or false descriptions of their holdings. The location of the farmhouses along a row, with fields behind, rather than out in the fields themselves, made census and taxation that much more efficient. Transfers of land through sale and inheritance would have to be updated from time to time, but for long periods the system would work with little adjustment.

Given the fact that it is highly unlikely that the total demolition, removal, and rebuilding of older villages was voluntary, combined with the later system of agricultural taxation, it is probable that the change we see in Scania’s agricultural landscape during the consolidation phase denotes the beginning of this agricultural recording and taxation system. These “symbolic” landholding records were useful in times when even many state officials were illiterate. By the 1500–1600s this system was replaced with paper maps and accompanying land books that recorded every strip of land, who owned it, and what taxes were due.

Fortunately, we can say more about agency than the likelihood that people would not have disassembled their homes and farms willingly. Indigenous chronicles (Pålsson and Edwards 1986) indicate that in the eleventh century, specifically the 1080s, the Scanians met with the Danish king in the traditional assembly, demanding that “ancient” obligations and entitlements be restored, while refusing new taxes and increased military service requirements. A high church tithe had also recently been imposed, exacerbating their economic problems. When the king intimidated them by executing the loudest protesters, the Scanians quieted for a while, but by the 1180s they were once more demanding that “foreign” leaders be removed (core-area Danes) and taxes be repealed. They soon proclaimed independence, initiated violent attacks against both church and state representatives of central government, and elected a king from a pool of prestate elite (Andersson 1947). After a series of slaughters called the Scanian Uprisings, Scania lost its war with the Danes.

With an admittedly “opulent” economy and a satisfactory way of life, local Scanian elites and peasants alike had little reason to willingly pay more taxes to maintain a state and church that they found economically oppressive. The traditional system included some taxation but also a great deal of autonomy from the state. They also shared the Germanic tradition of rejecting or killing overbearing rulers, a freedom they probably still perceived, given their bold protests to the king (Thurston 2001). The bloody protohistoric uprisings were a continuation of a long-term attempt to remain disarticulated from the state. Why did it take 100 years, or five generations, for dissatisfaction to erupt into violence? Those who are prosperous are often politically conservative and less willing to endanger their lives and their holdings. They will usually attempt to negotiate as long as possible, to maintain their way of life before resorting to bloodshed. In the same 100 years the state’s mechanisms for control also grew stronger. The Scanians apparently waited too long.
THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SEQUENCE IN NORTH JUTLAND

There is much evidence supporting widespread, state-sponsored landscape change in Scania. However, it is not clear that elsewhere in Denmark similar sequences occurred. The work carried out by our project in North Jutland, which is continuing today, has begun to reveal how elite and non-elite central and local strategies differed from region to region. We are now examining how integration and consolidation in North Jutland, in a district called Thy, differed dramatically from Scania during the same relative time frame.

As noted above, North Jutland was home to the Teutones, and also at least one other distinct ethnopolitical group in the earlier preintegration phase, the neighboring Cimbri of Himmerland. During the migration of Germanic people across the Romanized continent several centuries earlier, both the Teutones and Cimbri were represented, both groups thus having origins as autonomous prestate polities. The same prestate social and political ideology as described in Tacitus, showing clear limits on elite power and the broad authority of farmers, would have been shared by these groups as they were in Scania. We fully expected to find archaeological evidence that Thy was at first highly resistant to the centralizing state.

Support for this hypothesis is again suggested by the protohistoric record: at approximately the same time that the Scanians were making initial demands for the restoration of old taxation levels and rights, yet were being intimidated into backing down by the terror of random executions, the North Jutlanders also rejected the new taxes and laws of the Danish king. The key difference was that the Jutlanders invaded Denmark’s core area with a populist army and killed the king and his entourage of relatives, supporters, and advisers (Pålsson 1986). The chronicles, although admittedly on the side of the king, make it clear that this was their perceived right because of dissatisfaction with new taxes and restrictive laws. This was 100 years earlier than the Scanian Uprising, the much-delayed but eventual outcome of continuing high tax burden on rich Scanian farmers.

The North Jutlanders later put their support behind the slain king’s brother, who was soon elected king of Denmark. This successor does not seem to have initiated any brutal retaliation on the rebels, as was done in Scania a hundred years later, and soon after, the North Jutlanders seem to be unified with Denmark. In the previously discussed Ethiopian example rulers were content to exploit the weak and leave those who are more organized alone. This factor may have been in play in the North Jutland unification sequence, especially after the show of force. While kinship was not the unifying factor, it is probable that other factors permitted the North Jutlanders to display such cohesive resistance. First, they had a strong ethnic bond that was many centuries old,
if not older. Second, they were not “opulent” in either crops or merchandise. While some were certainly rich, and most may have been comfortable enough, they had far less to lose in the way of property than they did in the way of autonomy. A combination of differing internal relationships and differing relations between the state and region may have contributed to their continuing self-determination. This in turn may have discouraged the still decentralized and weak kingship to leave well enough alone and go after easier prey.

But why did the North Jutlanders soon after join with the state? One can imagine the costs of this relationship to both sides, but what were the benefits? At this point it is necessary to return to the environment.

We know from environmental reconstructions that the region was not agriculturally rich. The same chronicler who in 1070 called Scania “opulent” stated that Jutland was a sterile wasteland, “a salt land and a vast wilderness” (Tschan 1959:187). This German churchman also noted, however, that there were many cities and towns there, wherever there was a bay or inlet. This raises two issues: first, although farmland may have been lacking, trade and markets were not. This brings us to the main geomorphological feature of the region: the Limfjord (Figure 6.5). This huge inland fjord system is a natural trade route. It cuts through from the Baltic all the way to the Atlantic, with not only a quicker route but one that is safe and shallow. The alternate way, across the top of Denmark through the Skagerrak, is treacherous sailing in dangerous cross-currents, impassible because of storms at certain times of year, and much longer. Thus the movement of goods across the Limfjord was ideal and led to the growth of trading places. The royally founded Viking Age city of Alborg, which was established around AD 950, is a clear example of centralized presence, but several other nameless markets from this era have been surveyed and excavated that date to the 800s. Thus, the region saw the development of trading places and urbanization nearly 300 years before Scania’s artificially introduced towns. Some of these had central elite presences in charge; it was not an unfamiliar presence even in a highly autonomous area. The benefits of state authority, in addition to the drawbacks, would have been well known.

Despite the fact that there was some wealth in the region and production for subsistence was not difficult, northern Jutland in general was less rich than Scania or the islands. Since they were poorer, did locals see advantage in a state urban/market system that the already-rich Scanians did not see? Jutlanders may have later assimilated into the state more easily because they were already used to state presence in trading places. Because some local elites were probably getting rich off the mercantile transport that passed through the Limfjord, local elites in North Jutland may have begun cooperating with and abdicating some of their power to the state much earlier.
It was also an ideal military seaway. Guarding the narrows at the eastern end of the waterway is the Viking Age royal fortress of Aggersborg, next to a regional royal estate from the same era. This part of the Limfjord is set in the small area of good soils found on the peninsula. Just to the west archaeologists have recently noted what is probably the remains of a state-built canal leading to the Skagerrak strait between Denmark and Norway, which was both a military target and threat. Similar canals have been found elsewhere in Denmark, built to enable the free movement of warships. Finally, the Limfjord is the site of at least one important national levying place where wartime fleets would gather. Thus, it is clear that whatever this region lacked in cereal, it made up for in essential strategic importance, both economic and military. We can surmise that North Jutland was the focus of elite attention during the state-building era, just a different kind of attention than Scania received.

Yet there was that eventual, successful uprising against the state by the North Jutlanders. It was sparked by a local event but due to the same general taxation and military obligation issues that caused protest elsewhere. The uprising was not an urban one but rural; what was being taxed if not grain production? This brings us to the second important point about Jutland’s economy. The primary subsistence strategy throughout Jutland’s prehistory was stock raising. There is evidence that in order to meet tax obligations, animals, and not cereals, were intensified. There is also evidence that the North Jutlanders were able to postpone this tax-related intensification by at least a century and maybe more, long past the era when the rest of Denmark was reorganizing to meet state demands.

**AGROPASTORAL ECONOMIES IN JUTLAND’S “SALT WASTELAND”**

Power and wealth in preintegration phase Jutland, during the Roman and Germanic Iron Ages, was always based in cattle and other livestock. Many archaeological excavations show that cattle were the primary product of the peninsula for many centuries. The west coast’s wet, calcareous marsh meadows were ideal for hay cutting and stock grazing. Several Iron Age sites present good examples of this. The early Iron Age village of Hødde, excavated in southwestern Jutland, was completely dominated by cattle production. Its size ranged over time from 11 to 27 farms. It is possible to count stall spaces, which are well preserved in the architecture of the longhouses, and the number of simultaneously used stalls in combined households ranges from 188 to 460 over time. A small amount of cereal farming in infields was practiced for subsistence.

Another excavated Iron Age village, Grøntoft, was located on a sandy hill among vast expanses of heath (Vad Odgaard 1985:121–127). Cattle production
was also the major activity here; pollen analytical work shows that some barley and spurrey were grown in a small “garden” field system around the village.

Elite settlements are found in a region of central Jutland belonging to the state’s core and probably represent central and not local elite. These began to emerge in the middle Viking Age and reached their peak around AD 1000 to 1050, the consolidation phase. These illustrate how elite landowners built their wealth with cattle. At the sites of Vorbasse and Omgård, single elite estates, stalls show that there were simultaneous facilities for 100 cows and 80 cows, respectively. In addition, one large facility at Omgård with narrower stalls indicates extensive horse breeding with room for 30 horses. In northern Jutland, with identical conditions, local rather than central elite probably had similar wealth bases in stock.

Other evidence for the widespread importance of cattle is the prehistoric road that runs up two-thirds of the length of Jutland, referred to in early chronicles as the ox-road (also called the army road, showing its dual duties). This was a major droving route along which cattle were driven to markets, such as Ribe in southern Jutland. In Ribe, the earliest trading town in Denmark (ca. AD 720), many arts and crafts were plied, but large areas with meter-thick deposits of pure cow dung indicate holding pens for live cattle. At Ribe and other trading places cows were apparently a major commodity, although their passing does not leave much evidence, unless fortuitous features are preserved, such as these dung layers.

**POLITICAL ECONOMY OR AGENCY? OR BOTH?**

In Jutland, during and after the consolidation phase, from 1000 to 1200, torps, the “new” agricultural hamlets, were founded, not only on the richer east coast but on the heath of the west as well. Torp density in Jutland’s better cereal farming areas was about .05 to .06 per square kilometer, similar to rich areas in the islands. In the poor heathland areas torp density was about .02 per square kilometer, much lower. In most of Denmark the linguistic element *torp* is combined either with a male genitive, such as Staffanstorp (Staffan’s settlement) or with terrain names such as in Grustorp (gravelly torp). Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, some are named for what was produced in them. The vast majority of these refer to animals, and almost all of these are in western and northern Jutland. Places called Kovstrup (cow torp) and similar abound and also many places referring to goats, sheep, pigs, and even a few to ducks or geese. Some refer to the production of linen (Hørup—flax torp). Thus, many of the “new” pioneering settlements in agriculturally poor parts of Jutland reflect animal intensification.

Probably, taxes were assessed in similar levels across Denmark. The existence of fewer torps in these cattle-production areas than in cereal-farming areas is
quite easy to explain. Ethnographic examples indicate that animal intensification, up to a certain point, can be accomplished by putting more animals on the same land, with very little effort. Such changes in pastoralism often occur when new factors are introduced, such as access to markets or the need to generate new income (Bencherifa and Johnson 1990:394), both of which the Jutlanders were experiencing. Usually in such cases the idea behind the strategy is to get maximum yield on cattle with the least possible amount of investment of labor and capital (Bencherifa and Johnson 1990:397). One method is by territorial expansion to accommodate more cattle (Bencherifa and Johnson 1990:398), such as is seen with the pioneering torp settlements. Another common strategy is to load more cattle onto the same land, which eventually causes ecological stress but can be done quite easily as a short-term strategy. Farmers can wait to breed more animals, but this is often not even necessary. Instead, they will use cash picked up in nearby towns, either during seasonal labor or by family members who migrate there to make extra income. Both of these possibilities could occur in Jutland, where there were many marketplaces and numerous small and large towns in the late Viking Age and early medieval. This money was then invested in cattle (Bencherifa and Johnson 1990:399), and we know that cattle were bought and sold because such is clear from the traces found at Ribe. There are no special demands on labor during such an increase, as unskilled youths are often used to manage the larger herds.

For traditional agropastoralists in modern times, increasing incorporation into a national-scale economic system is a fact of life, both because of increased demands and the possibility for herders to generate economic rewards over and above what is due to the government. Indigenous farmers are completely aware of the changes that national policies subject them to, and these farmers are observed, first, to take advantage of opportunities for themselves that arise in such conditions and, second, to work toward increasing their own production efficiency and toward gaining knowledge about fairly distant market processes (Cruz 1999:380). Animals in most of these societies, as in Iron Age Jutland, have always been symbols of prestige, so this goes along with traditional systems rather than interrupting them (Bencherifa and Johnson 1990:400).

OTHER MEASURES OF THE AGENCY MODEL

So far we have looked at Jutland’s differing sequence as a strategy of the state for exploiting differing resources. We have also looked at the probability that the methods used to produce income for new taxes was self-organized. But this combination of state demands and self-organized intensification is not the end of the story. In addition to being lower in density and reflecting activities of husbandry in their toponymy, all the torps we have investigated in North
Jutland during our many years of archaeological fieldwork appear to have been founded at least several generations later than those in Scania, at the very end and not the beginning of the consolidation phase.

In every case Scanian torps have late Viking ceramics (ca. AD 1000) scattered on the surface and in subsurface features, while those in Thy appear to be founded no earlier than 1100 and often as late as 1200. This means that the expansion and intensification of pastoral strategies was either not undertaken, or it was undertaken at a relatively low level during the time when other parts of Denmark, most notably Scania, were turned upside down by intensification efforts. Furthermore, in direct opposition to the sequence in Scania, in our many years of surveying, testing, and excavating in Thy, we have found no evidence of “contraction” or the demolition/reconstruction of older villages. In fact, in most cases Viking era houses lie immediately beneath early medieval ones, something that is almost never found in Scania. Thus, not only was North Jutland’s intensification effort much later, but it was not accompanied by any large-scale uprooting and resettlement.

The fact that North Jutlanders gathered an indigenous army and disposed of the king and many of his key supporters in 1086 cannot be overemphasized. It is possible that in part, perhaps very large part, the lack of direct interference in agriculture and taxation-related settlement change seen archaeologically was not due to state disinterest, or to the lack of arable land, or to the ability to meet tax burdens merely by increasing numbers of cattle on the hoof but to local resistance.

Lack of reprisal by the state after the North Jutlanders’ act of regicide may indicate that early kings did not yet have authority to punish those with strong unity mechanisms, acting under the precepts of ancient social codes. Later kings, who responded quickly to the Scanian Uprising a few generations afterward, had consolidated their power and were able to impose previously unknown levels of coercion.

The North Jutlanders may have forestalled large increases in taxation through their show of force. The next ruler backed off of pressuring them, making unification with the state, with whom they were already profitably interacting, much easier. Quite soon after the rebellion, the region was rapidly incorporated into the state and fully integrated with the state system. By the time a few generations had passed, the state was the agent most capable of showing “force” through its summary crushing of the rebel Scanians. Later generations in North Jutland responded to tax demands with the above-described strategies, which may have been largely self-organized.
CONCLUSIONS: THE SURPASSING COMPLEXITY
OF THE SOCIONATURAL LANDSCAPE

The substantivist-formalist debate surrounding economic anthropology of the 1960s stressed the differences between models that gave primacy to either the complete interdependence of social and natural factors and the predominance of culture in decision making or to “rational,” maximizing choices carried out through individual or group agency. More recent ethnographic models have stressed a much more complex picture of the relationships between economic, social, and political behavior. Most societies do practice rational, agency-based decision making, but how it progresses is largely defined by culture. When differing cultural constructs, such as subcultures within a state, are subjected to similarly changing economic circumstances, the outcomes are likely to be shaped differently as well. One way to frame this process is through the concept of structuration (Giddens 1984), a more contemporary take on the importance of social structures but different from the old substantivist concept in that it stresses the idea of a recursive and dialectical relationship between structure and agency: people make decisions based on conditions and beliefs within their society, be it nation-state or subculture, but their actions also actively change society. In addition, there is more emphasis today on human behavior and the study of processes leading to such changes, the “historical” basis of change (even in prehistoric contexts), and the evolution of socioeconomic practices rather than on a concept of static cultural structures and institutions. This does not preclude the existence of overarching and comparative human responses to conditions and change, through which we can compare behavior across many cultures. These two perspectives, stressing historicity on the one hand and predictability on the other, must be combined and studied on different levels of interaction in order to more closely model past societies.

These complimentary models more accurately reflect the almost infinite complexity involved in trajectories of change—a complexity that is daunting to many archaeologists—yet at the same time they permit us to construct sets of predictable and comparable strategies. I hope to have demonstrated that in many contexts a presupposition of complex relationships and behaviors should be interwoven with research design for archaeological fieldwork so that we may rationally maximize our ability to reconstruct the historically contingent past. As has been demonstrated, variation in human exploitation of the landscape, such as settlement and land-use choices, population density, and agriculture (Birks et al. 1988:209), can be traced in part to underlying ecological factors: climate, hydrology, topography, and soil fertility, as in Denmark. Yet, in the case of Denmark, it has been possible to also examine some specific relationships between the landscape and cultural systems, as well as between differing cultural systems themselves, and to reasonably
examine intentionality and agency. Given that we know that central-state authorities in Denmark desired the incorporation and domination of both Scania and North Jutland, and that Scania and North Jutland actively resisted this trajectory, we have been able to contextualize regionalized evidence of intensification and hypothesize about whether some manifestations were agency-based local responses to changing demands and expectations, while others were top-down political economy directives from local elite, all operating at the same time and with different dynamics.

Only some archaeological sequences have the benefit of ethnohistoric data, yet at each juncture where historic data were relevant in the preceding case study, a number of other threads of evidence, purely archaeological, were there to be interpreted as well. Relevant ethnographic analogy can judiciously be used in the study of prehistoric or protohistoric sequences. If we ask questions of all data categories that presuppose complex interactions rather than deny them, our interpretations will more accurately reflect the past than the sometimes overly simplified models of earlier eras.

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